



Emotional Reactivity, Negative Affect, and Executive Functioning: Does Physiology Matter? 
 
by  





A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  













Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2020 




I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including 
any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.  




Emotional reactivity reflects the activation, intensity, and duration of an emotional event. 
Although it is well-established that emotional reactivity has negative implications on 
psychological functioning, studies have demonstrated that high emotional reactivity enhances 
executive functioning performance when in negative mood states. The underlying mechanisms 
that elicit these benefits remain less understood. The current study investigated the relationship 
between negative affect and executive functioning by examining the role of emotional reactivity 
through self-report questionnaires and objective physiological skin conductance measures. 
Participants completed a task of working memory embedded with emotional images, while 
electrodermal activity was recorded. Based on previous research, we predicted that individuals 
with high emotional reactivity would perform better on the working memory task when in a 
negative mood state compared to low-reactive individuals. At the physiological level, we 
hypothesized that high-reactive individuals would demonstrate higher phasic peaks to 
emotionally-laden content compared to low-reactive individuals. We also predicted that the 
underlying mechanism that would lead high-reactive individuals to experience better behavioural 
performance on the task would be a more rapid physiological habituation to the negative 
condition, as they would shift attention from the negative images back to the working memory 
task more quickly. Results indicated that high-reactive individuals actually performed worse in 
the negative condition compared to low-reactive individuals. Moreover, emotional reactivity did 
not predict skin conductance magnitudes. Finally, individuals with high emotional reactivity 
habituated to the negative condition more quickly than individuals with low-reactivity; however, 
more rapid habituation did not improve behavioural performance on the working memory task. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Executive Functions  
 Executive function is an umbrella term for higher order cognitive skills that facilitate 
goal-directed behaviour (Goldstein et al., 2014). Executive functions include a wide variety of 
skills and processes that are used to self-regulate an individual’s thoughts and behaviours in 
pursuit of specific goals. According to Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) unity and diversity 
framework, executive skills are conceptualized as separable yet interrelated constructs, and they 
are critical for navigating the changing milieu of day-to-day life. These foundational or ‘core’ 
skills include the ability to keep goal-relevant information in mind (e.g., working memory), 
refrain from actions that are pre-potent yet inappropriate in a given goal-context (e.g., response 
inhibition), and flexibly switch between different mental sets and/or behaviours (e.g., shifting) in 
the service of goal attainment (Miyake et al., 2000). Historically, investigations of executive 
functions were tied to neuropsychological studies that identified functional deficits in patients 
who had frontal lobe damage. These individuals experienced severe challenges in behavioural 
control and regulation, as well as in their ability to function properly in their daily lives (Miyake 
et al., 2000).   
Working Memory 
Contrasting Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) view of executive functions as separate but 
connected constructs, Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) conceptualization of working memory 
suggests a more unitary view of executive functioning. This model postulates that goal-related 
thoughts and behaviours are ultimately controlled by a limited-capacity central executive, which 
is linked to functioning in the frontal lobe. These central structures and processes work together 
to maintain, store, and manipulate “active” task-relevant information for a temporary period of 
time in order to support processes related to thinking and behaving. Additionally, working 
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memory also interacts with long-term memory, which is responsible for “passive” stores of 
information for longer durations of time. This process enables individuals to upload and 
download information from long-term memory systems (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968).  
Engle and colleagues further developed Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) central executive 
concept by proposing a dual-component model of working memory capacity (Kane et al., 2007; 
Kane & Engle, 2002; Unsworth & Engle, 2007a; Unsworth & Engle, 2007b). This dual-
component model suggests that working memory capacity consists of two controlled functions of 
the central executive. The first function is executive attention, referring to an individual’s ability 
to focus attention within the domain of primary memory on pertinent information in highly 
activated states while distracting information is present. The second function refers to a 
calculated search of secondary memory, demonstrating the ability to retrieve appropriate 
information from long-term storage, in the presence of competitive information that is irrelevant 
to the task at hand (Kane & Engle, 2002). 
Particular executive functioning performance tasks (e.g., complex span tasks) reflect 
these two functions of working memory capacity. For example, within the Symmetry Span Task, 
the memory component of the task includes sets of items that the individual must remember 
(e.g., positions of squares in sequential order within a 16-square grid). However, between 
presentations of these square items, participants must engage in irrelevant processing 
components of the task (e.g., identifying whether an image is symmetrical or not). As such, 
working memory capacity (e.g., the ability to correctly identify positions and sequences of the 
squares) is measured during states of interference from the second processing component of the 
task. Individual differences in working memory are common and influence performance on these 
tasks (Conway et al., 2005). Differences in performance result from significant variability in 
individuals’ capacity to apply their working memory and other executive skills – particularly in 
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situations that are affective in nature (Gyurak et al., 2012). 
Affect 
 Core affect has previously been defined as a “neurophysiological state consciously 
accessible as the simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions” (Russell, 
2003, p. 148). There are a variety of conceptualizations regarding what makes up the construct of 
affect. Russell’s (1980) original four-factor circumplex model of affect demonstrated the 
interplay of combined arousal and pleasure aspects, as it included factors of pleasure, excitement, 
arousal, and contentment. As such, this model suggested that both positive and negative affect 
vary with regards to levels of physiological arousal and satisfaction. Updated work by Russell 
(2003) suggested that core affect is made up of a single bivalent dimension of pleasure and 
displeasure, as well as a dimension of activation and deactivation. Watson and Tellegen (1985) 
proposed a more rudimentary model of affect. They postulated that affect includes two distinct 
orthogonal dimensions; a positive dimension and negative dimension to affect, each of which 
ranges from high to low. This particular model does not include an arousal factor, although 
subsequent work by Watson and colleagues (1999) incorporated factors associated with arousal 
and contentment.  
Affect Inductions 
Over the past several decades, research has investigated the influence of emotions on 
various aspects of functioning by employing a variety of mood induction techniques to induce 
affective states. These techniques include the use of images (Lang et al., 2008), films (Gross & 
Levenson, 1995), self-generated imagery (e.g., recounting autobiographical recollections or 
reliving past events from previous memories; Zhang et al., 2014), music (Sutherland et al., 
1982), a combination of self-generated imagery and music (the Music and Contemplation in 
Idiographic context technique; Eich et al., 2007), facial muscle movements (Ekman et al., 1983), 
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hypnosis (Bower, 1983), interactions with trained confederates (Ax, 1953) and even drugs or 
sleep deprivation (both of which pose ethical concerns and are less frequently used in 
contemporary research; Martin, 1990; Hagemann et al., 1999).  
One of the most widely used affect inductions that requires no deception and is easily 
standardized among participants involves the presentation of visual affective stimuli (e.g., 
images) to elicit positive, negative, and neutral affective responses (Zhang et al., 2014). The 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008) is an internationally known 
method of disseminating a large set of emotionally-laden photographs that span a variety of 
content categories (e.g., people, animals, objects, etc.). The images available vary in three 
different dimensions; valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant), arousal (ranging from calm 
to excited), and dominance (ranging from experiencing feelings of low control to high control 
when looking at the image; Lang et al., 2008). Duration of image presentations typically range 
from subliminal applications of 2.5 seconds (Chiew & Braver, 2011) up to durations of 8 
seconds (Amrhein et al., 2004) in order to elicit emotional responses. IAPS images are 
considered to be an effective mood induction technique and have been incorporated into studies 
examining the influence of affect on executive skills like working memory (Wingert et al., 
2018), as well as attention (Bradley & Lang, 2007), pain tolerance (Meagher et al., 2001), 
personality (Tok et al., 2010), and physiology (Smith et al., 2005). 
Affective Influences on Executive Functions 
Varying affective states influence individuals’ ability to implement their executive skills.  
Recent studies have demonstrated that emotional content may capture attention, ultimately 
resulting in diminished capacity for ongoing cognitive processing (Mather, 2007). Wingert and 
colleagues (2018) conducted a study that examined the ways in which valence and arousal 
influence attentional processes during working memory encoding on the Symmetry Span Task. 
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This cognitive test was modified to include negative and neutral images from the IAPS, which 
were embedded into the encoding phases of each trial. Across three experiments, they found that 
negative high arousing images impaired working memory encoding more strongly when 
compared with neutral images, as evidenced by diminished partial span scores on the cognitive 
task. Within study 2, they further determined that the presence of neutral images also led to 
impaired working memory performance compared to the traditional administration of the 
Symmetry Span Task without the inclusion of images. As such, the presentation of any image 
had a distracting effect on attention, which resulted in poorer working memory performance. 
Study 3 included negative and neutral images that were both of high and low levels of arousal. 
Negative and high arousing images captured attention and were processed despite their lack of 
congruence with task goals, and this increased recollections of the images in a subsequent 
recognition task (Wingert et al., 2018).  
Theoretical Frameworks for how Affect Influences Executive Functioning 
Mitchell and Phillips (2007) were interested in assessing whether certain theoretical 
frameworks are able to explain the influence of affect on executive functioning. As such, they 
conducted a review of various papers and developed a number of theoretical models to examine 
the relationship between these two constructs.  
Cognitive Load Theory  
The cognitive load theory postulates that both positive and negative affective states will 
result in greater activation of working memory through a widespread network of thoughts that 
are emotion-focused, and ultimately loads up cognitive resources. They suggest that individuals 
ruminate about mood-relevant information instead of task-relevant information, which 




The mood-as-information theory considers the influence of positive and negative affect 
on executive skills distinctly. It suggests that positive moods signify the absence of a threat and 
reduces motivation to alter current circumstances. As such, it results in a heuristic processing 
style that leads to shortcuts and non-rigorous ways of working through tasks, which ultimately 
impairs executive functioning performance. Contrastingly, negative moods reflect the presence 
of a threat and motivates an individual to carry out careful, systematic, and detailed problem-
solving to work through the threat. For that reason, negative mood promotes an analytic 
processing style, which is expected to improve executive performance (Mitchell & Phillips, 
2007). 
The review article by Mitchell and Phillips (2007) found, with regards to working 
memory performance, that positive mood states influenced executive skills in a negative manner, 
while no consistent patterns of results were determined for the effect of negative mood states on 
working memory. For shifting abilities, the review suggested that positive mood negatively 
influenced switching task performance in cases where participants were required to switch to 
previously attended to stimuli in the environment. However, when novel information was being 
processed, positive mood enhanced switching abilities. The researchers noted that there is a 
dearth in the literature regarding the influence on positive and negative mood for response 
inhibition. Evidently, the findings of this review suggest that positive mood states impair 
executive skills (thus supporting the cognitive load theory and mood-as-information theory), 
while negative moods do not appear to influence executive functions (which does not support 
either theory). The results of this review were inconclusive and did not clearly support one 
particular theoretical perspective for the influence of affect on executive functioning. These 
findings suggest that the associations between affect and executive functioning may be 
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moderated by factors that have not yet been explored in the literature. One aspect that was not 
given much attention in the articles reviewed in this paper was arousal, which is a key factor in 
the affect models. As such, the present study is interested in examining arousal, in the form of 
emotional reactivity, to determine whether emotional reactivity moderates how affect influences 
executive functioning performance.  
Emotional Reactivity 
Emotional reactivity reflects how readily individuals experience emotional arousal to an 
event, at what intensity, and for what duration of time (Davidson, 1998; Nock et al., 2008). There 
are a variety of factors that culminate in the experience of emotional reactivity. At the onset of an 
emotional stimulus, there is a particular duration of time, termed the emotional response time, for 
which it takes the emotional response to be activated. Following activation, the intensity of 
emotional response to that stimulus rises until it reaches its peak amplitude. The intensity will 
ultimately decrease and will return back to its baseline level (see Figure 1; Becerra & Campitelli, 
2013). Studies suggest that individuals who experience high levels of emotional reactivity 
typically react to stressful circumstances with increased levels of negative affect and have 
maladaptive evaluations of these events. For that reason, individuals high in emotional reactivity 
typically experience predominantly negative emotional reactivity (Shapero et al., 2016). 
Individual Differences in Emotional Reactivity 
Variability in emotional reactivity can arise in a number of different ways, including (a) 
the threshold for how strong a stimulus is required to be in order to elicit an emotional response 
or how quickly the level of arousal reaches its peak altitude (b) the level of intensity of the 
emotional response (e.g., the peak amplitude of the arousal) (c) the duration for which it takes 
the level of arousal to return to its baseline (Davidson, 1998). Together, these terms are typically 
conceptualized as activation, intensity, and duration, which make up the construct of emotional 
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reactivity (Becerra & Campitelli, 2013). Differences in emotional reactivity levels have been 
discerned as early as in the first year of life, such that infants will exhibit varied responses to the 
same emotional stimuli based on how emotionally reactive they are, and these reactivity levels 
persist into later years (Ursache et al., 2013; Diener et al., 1985; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck 
2007). 
Emotional Reactivity and Temperament 
Emotional reactivity and temperament are two distinct but related constructs (Nock et al., 
2008). Emotional reactivity has previously been conceptualized as a dimension of temperament. 
Temperament is posited as a much larger construct that encompasses emotional reactivity, as 
well as other factors associated with behaviour (e.g., self-regulation). According to Rothbart and 
Ahadi (1994), temperament refers to an intrinsic tendency toward both positive and negative 
emotional arousal. It further encompasses regulation of arousal through both voluntary processes 
such as attention, as well as automatic processes including avoidance or self-soothing 
(Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Rothbart & Ahadi, 1994). Kagan and colleagues (1998) found 
that when exposed to novelty, high levels of temperamental negative emotionality in infancy is 
moderately stable throughout the first 5 years of life (Kagan et al., 1998). However, 13% of 
infants in this study who were classified as high in reactivity at 4 months demonstrated inhibited 
temperament in subsequent assessments, indicating that changes in negative emotionality may be 
linked to the development of strategies to regulate emotional reactivity (Kagan et al., 1998).  
Emotional Reactivity and Emotion Regulation 
Emotional reactivity has also been conceptualized as a component of the well-researched 
construct of emotion regulation. Emotional regulation incorporates both intrinsic and extrinsic 
processes related to monitoring, assessing, and adapting emotional reactions in order to obtain 
goals (Becerra & Campitelli, 2013). These processes vary along a continuum and include 
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voluntary reactions (e.g., having an awareness and understanding of emotions, strategies to 
regulate emotions, and impulse control), as well as involuntary reactions related to emotional 
responses (e.g., emotional reactivity). The family environment plays an important role in 
children’s abilities to develop emotional regulation strategies. Beginning in infancy, self-
regulation strategies mature through direct observation of parents’ behaviours and emotional 
responses. A study by Bernier and colleagues (2010) reviewed how external influences affect 
self-regulation in infants. They demonstrated that parent-infant interactions between the ages of 
12 to 15 months had subsequent influences on executive functioning skills related to impulse 
control and working memory, and that maternal autonomy support (e.g., mothers’ behaviours 
that aim to support their child’s goals, decisions, and sense of volition) was the strongest 
predictor of these skills.  Development of emotional regulation strategies is also affected by 
particular parenting styles and the emotional climate within the family (Morris et al., 2007). 
Although automatic and volitional categories of emotional regulation are shown to be distinct 
constructs, it is presumed that they function in a hierarchical manner. Emotional reactivity, 
which is considered to be involuntary arousal in the form of automatic regulation, is suggested to 
lead to the emergence of voluntary control processes like attention and executive functions, 
which support self-regulation (Ursache et al., 2013). Thus, emotional reactivity can lead to a 
predisposition of difficulties with emotion regulation (Nock et al., 2008).  
Negative Consequences of Emotional Reactivity 
High emotional reactivity is considered an important risk factor for the development and 
maintenance of psychopathology. Numerous studies suggest a link between mood disorders and 
emotional reactivity (Bylsma et al., 2008; Shapero et al., 2016; Gruber et al., 2011). Emotionally 
reactive responses were found to weaken with clinical levels of depression (Bylsma et al., 
2008); however, subthreshold depression was related to greater negative emotional responses 
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(e.g., Shapero et al., 2016). Similarly, Shapero and colleagues (2019) indicated that high 
emotional reactivity was directly linked with increased depressive symptoms. They also noted 
that factors may influence the relationship between emotional reactivity and depression. For 
example, maltreatment may enhance the connection between emotional reactivity, depression, 
and suicidal thoughts and behaviours, while resiliency factors associated with coping abilities of 
stress may buffer the effects of emotional reactivity (Shapero et al., 2019). Emotional reactivity 
has also been investigated in individuals with bipolar disorder. Gruber and colleagues (2011) 
demonstrated that individuals with inter-episode bipolar disorder who were exposed to 
emotionally arousing films (happy, neutral, and sad) experienced increased self-reported positive 
emotional reactivity across all films compared to healthy controls; however, these individuals did 
not experience emotional recovery.  
Emotional reactivity has also been linked with clinical levels of anxiety. Macatee and 
Cougle (2013) demonstrated that heightened levels of emotional reactivity came out as a salient 
feature of generalized anxiety symptoms. Furthermore, Goldin and colleagues (2009) reported 
that individuals with social anxiety disorder experienced emotional hyperactivity, and they 
demonstrated that these individuals experienced greater negative emotion than controls during 
social and physical threat. Within child populations, Carthy and colleagues (2010) established 
that children with anxiety experienced greater intensity and frequency of negative emotional 
reactions, deficiencies in utilizing reappraisal in negative emotional situations and self-efficacy, 
and an increased dependency on negative emotion regulation strategies. This, in turn, 
exacerbated risk of impaired functioning, intense negative emotion, and deficiencies in self-
efficacy related to emotion regulation (Carthy et al., 2010).  
Studies have also demonstrated the association between emotional reactivity and 
substance use disorders. For example, a study by Kornreich and colleagues (1998) suggests that 
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newly detoxified alcoholics who were shown affective film excerpts demonstrated greater 
within-group emotional variability compared to controls. Personality disorders, such as 
borderline personality disorder (BPD), are also distinguished by a susceptibility for hyperarousal 
with regards to emotions (Linehan, 1993). Similar to Davidson’s (1998) description of the three 
factors that make up emotional reactivity, Linehan (1993) postulates that individuals with BPD 
experience negative emotional responses that are readily activated, intense in magnitude, and 
persistent in duration. 
Disruption in the development and implementation of emotional regulation skills is also 
suggested to increase emotional reactivity and subsequent psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2010). 
For example, one study found that adolescents who experienced greater emotion dysregulation, 
which was evidenced by heightened expressions of emotional states (e.g., emotional reactivity), 
were likely to endure greater depressive symptoms when confronted with stressors (McLaughlin 
et al., 2009). Silk and colleagues (2003) further suggested that individuals who experienced more 
intense and labile emotions and had a limited ability to self-regulate reported experiencing 
increased rates of depressive symptoms and greater externalizing behavioural problems. 
Positive Consequences of Emotional Reactivity 
Although high emotional reactivity has been associated with increased risk for a variety 
of psychological disorders, previous research has also demonstrated some benefits associated 
with increased emotional reactivity. For example, Gabel and McAuley (2018, in press) 
conducted a study examining the moderating effect of emotional reactivity on executive 
functioning and mood. In one study, participants’ natural variations in mood were assessed, such 
that individuals participated in the study with whatever mood state they entered the lab in. The 
researchers found that negative affect was associated with variable performance on executive 
functioning tasks (e.g., response inhibition and working memory); however, the nature of this 
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relationship depended on levels of emotional reactivity. Individuals high in emotional reactivity 
performed better on the executive skills tasks when they experienced negative affect, while 
individuals low in emotional reactivity performed worse in these tasks (Gabel & McAuley, 
2018). A second study was conducted with negative and positive mood inductions (e.g., written 
tasks with mood congruent music) and similar patterns of findings emerged. High emotionally 
reactive individuals in the negative mood induction condition performed quicker on a response 
inhibition task compared to individuals with low emotional reactivity. Interestingly, individuals 
in the positive mood induction condition did not vary significantly based on reactivity levels 
(Gabel & McAuley, in press). 
The results of these studies may provide evidence in support of an integration of 
theoretical perspectives of the cognitive load theory and the mood-as-information theory. The 
studies demonstrate that negative mood states may either bias individuals towards more analytic 
processing styles, which improves cognitive performance, or they may place demand on 
cognitive resources, thereby impeding performance. It appears that executive functioning 
performance in these mood states is moderated by whether an individual is high or low in 
emotional reactivity. Interestingly, Gabel and McAuley (2018) suggested that high emotionally 
reactive individuals may demonstrate improved performance on executive functioning tasks as a 
consequence of how typical it is for them to experience negative affective states in their daily 
lives while simultaneously utilizing their executive skills. As a result, they are more ‘practiced’ 
at using these skills under negative emotionally arousing circumstances. Presently, a paucity in 
the literature exists regarding what mechanisms may facilitate these processes. As such, the 
current study seeks to determine whether physiological habituation acts as a mechanism that 
allows for individuals high in emotional reactivity to ultimately benefit from the experience of a 
bad mood when they employ their executive skills.  
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Habituation  
 “Habituation is an evolutionarily ancient mechanism of neuronal plasticity and non-
associative learning whereby behavioral and physiological responses during initial exposure to a 
stimulus diminishes with repeated presentations of that stimulus” (Pace-Schott et al., 2011, p. 2). 
As individuals with high emotional reactivity more regularly experience negative moods, we are 
interested in assessing whether these individuals demonstrate something akin to habituation in 
relation to these negative affective states more rapidly than individuals who are not used to 
consistently being in these states. As habituation is expected to be quicker in high-emotionally 
reactive individuals, they may be able to divert their attention back to the task and use their 
executive skills more effectively than those who are less experienced at integrating these skills in 
negative mood states.  
A variety of theories have been proposed to outline the mechanisms by which habituation 
occurs. These include the stimulus-model comparator theory, gnostic unit theory, and the dual-
process theory. Evgeny Sokolov (1960, 1963) developed the stimulus-model comparator theory 
of habituation by examining arousal of the orienting response as the foundation of his studies. He 
expressed that the orienting response, which is established via EEG activity, results in 
heightened sensitivity through the amplifying system when one is exposed to a novel stimulus or 
a change in a previously experienced stimulus. When an orienting response occurs, the 
individual, or organism will experience observable behaviours and physiological responses, but 
will then experience habituation upon repeated presentation of that stimulus.  It is suggested that 
the mechanism by which this occurs stems from the development of a stimulus model, which is 
formed within the cerebral cortex. As the same stimulus is presented repeatedly, this stimulus 
model continuously develops, and greater inhibition on the amplifying system results in 
habitation. When new or altered stimuli are experienced that do not match the stimulus model, 
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the orienting response is no longer inhibited.  
 The Wagner-Konorski gnostic unity theory elaborates on Sokolov’s theory by focusing 
on the role of short-term memory and associative networks. Within this model, a stimulus object 
is processed through afferent networks towards a memory system, the gnostic assembly, and to 
the arousal system. Following the repeated presentation of the stimulus, the gnostic unity is 
formed, whereby a neuronal model or memory of that stimulus becomes progressively more 
accurate. As this develops, there is activation of an inhibitory system that hinders the arousal 
system. This model includes a reverberating circuit of transient memory (short-term memory) as 
well as influences of pre-existing associative networks. Additionally, particular contextual cues 
may be engaged through the associative network, which excite the representations of that 
stimulus within memory (the gnostic assembly) and can result in context-specific long-term 
habituation.  
Grove & Thompson’s (1970, 1973) dual process theory suggests that any stimulus will 
prompt two separate processes in the central nervous system that interact with one another in 
order to elicit habituation. These processes include habituation (decremental) and sensitization 
(incremental). When a stimulus is presented, both habituation and sensitization are activated. The 
behaviour that will be elicited is correlated with the process that is more dominant. For example, 
if habituation is greater than sensitization, there will be a diminished response; if sensitization is 
greater than habituation, an increased response will occur. Two neural pathways are involved; a 
“stimulus-response” (S-R) pathway, which is involved when a stimulus-evoked response is being 
habituated, and a “state-system” pathway, which is involved in the development of sensitization.  
The state-system pathway acts on the S-R pathway to elicit the final behavioural outcome. This 
conceptualization of habituation is most typically accepted in contemporary research.  
While habituation is typically examined by presenting a singular exemplar that 
 15 
individuals are exposed to repeatedly, the present study investigates habituation to a specific 
category of stimuli with different exemplars. In daily life, it is quite common to face a host of 
negative affective stimuli rather than exposure to the same stimulus repeatedly. Thus, using 
novel images may be more representative of how negative affect is experienced in typical daily 
life. Individuals high in emotional reactivity may be better at coping with this category of 
negative information due to practice.  
Electrodermal Activity 
In an effort to understand the process of habituation, measurements of physiological 
habituation have been used to examine how individuals experience autonomic reactions to events 
that elicit emotional responses. Emotions have previously been measured through autonomic 
arousal in the autonomic nervous system (ANS), which is a physiological system responsible for 
regulating peripheral functions (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). The ANS consists of the sympathetic 
and parasympathetic nervous system, which are associated with activation of the fight-flight-
freeze response (e.g., increased heart rate, blood pressure, and sweating) and slow changing 
processes associated with resting and digestion, respectively. The physiological arousal 
component of emotion reflects the activation of the sympathetic nervous system and the 
deactivation of the parasympathetic nervous system (Mauss & Robinson, 2009).  
 One of the most commonly assessed indices of ANS activation is skin conductance, also 
commonly referred to as electrodermal activity or galvanic skin response. Skin conductance is a 
non-invasive measure of changes in electrical conductivity of the skin. It is considered to be one 
of the most sensitive measures of emotional arousal and is solely modulated by autonomic 
sympathetic activity that drives bodily processes at the subconscious level. As skin conductance 
cannot be consciously controlled, it is the ideal marker for emotional arousal by providing pure 
insight into the physiological processes of a person based on their psychological operations 
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(iMotion Guide, 2016).  
History of Skin Conductance Measures  
The study of psychological influences on electrical changes in skin spans over 100 years 
(Dawson et al., 2017). Fere (1888) and Tarchanoff (1890) were two influential figures in setting 
the foundation for current measurement techniques in electrodermal activities. Fere (1888) 
demonstrated that momentary decreases in skin resistance in response to various forms of stimuli 
(e.g., ranging from visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, etc.) could be detected by passing a 
small electrical current across two electrodes that are positioned on the skin’s surface. This 
discovery was crucial to the study of electrodermal activity, as it established that the skin 
momentarily becomes a better conductor of electricity when an individual is exposed to stimuli 
external to the body (Dawson et al., 2017). Tarchanoff (1890) elaborated on this idea and 
suggested that one can measure changes in electrical potentials between two electrodes on the 
skin in the absence of an external current. As a result of these discoveries, contemporary research 
in skin conductance focuses on one of two methods: the exosomatic method addresses the skin 
resistance response (or its reciprocal, the skin conductance response), which depends on 
movement of an external current across the skin, and the endosomatic method, which suggests 
that recordings of the skin potential response do not require external currents. The present study 
focuses on the exosomatic method of recording the phasic skin conductance response (SCR), as 
this is the method widely utilized in contemporary electrodermal activity research (Dawson et 
al., 2017).  
Anatomical and Physiological Aspects of Electrodermal Activity 
The skin is the largest organ in the human body and serves many functions, such as 
preventing external substances from entering the body and thermoregulation. The skin further 
receives signals from the brain, and electrodermal activity is the measurement of the electrical 
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changes that result from these signals (Edelberg, 1972).  
The secretion theory relates electrodermal activity to sweat gland activity (Dawson et al., 
2017). Darrow (1927) found that sweat secretion and electrodermal activity were closely 
associated with one another. However, Darrow determined that the SCR, the phasic response that 
is sensitive to emotionally arousing stimuli, begins approximately 1 second prior to moisture 
appearing on the surface of the skin. As such, it was determined that a critical component 
underlying electrodermal activity is the activation of the sweat glands themselves, not the 
identification of sweat on the skin. 
 The human body contains approximately 3 million sweat glands, and the density of sweat 
glands varies across different areas of the body (iMotion Guide, 2016). The eccrine glands, 
which are primarily associated with thermoregulation, contain a coiled compact body which is 
considered to be the secretory aspect of the gland, as well as the sweat duct, which is a long tube 
that serves as the excretory component of the gland that opens at the surface of the skin as a pore 
(Edelberg, 1972). Electrodermal activities, such as electrical changes in the SCL and SCR 
amplitudes, are based entirely in the sweat glands (Edelberg, 1993).  
Recording Electrodermal Activity 
Electrodermal activity is measured through the passage of a small current through a pair 
of electrodes that are strategically placed on surfaces of the skin that have significant eccrine 
glands (e.g., typically including the volar surfaces on medial phalanges, volar surfaces of distal 
phalanges, and thenar and hypothenar eminences of palms; Dawson et al., 2017). Measurement 
of skin resistance or conductance follows Ohm’s law, which indicates that skin resistance (R) is 
equivalent to the voltage (V) applied between two electrodes placed on the skin surface, divided 
by the current (I) being passed through the skin (i.e., R = V/I). Skin conductance is considered to 
be the reciprocal of skin resistance. Skin conductance research utilizes equipment that applies a 
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constant voltage to the skin through electrodes, which is undetectable to the participant. As such, 
the current flow can be measured, allowing for the measurement of skin conductance.   
Skin conductance is characterized by SCL and SCR. The SCL is considered to be the 
tonic level, which varies slowly and only exhibits slight changes that change in occurrence from 
tens of seconds to minutes (iMotion guide, 2016). SCL is the baseline level of skin conductance 
that rises and declines consistently in the absence of particular environmental events, but is 
affected by individual differences in hydration, skin dryness, and autonomic regulation. As such, 
it is not considered to be a highly informative measure on its own. The SCR is the phasic 
component, which typically exhibits much quicker changes in the form of SCR peaks. SCR is 
particularly sensitive to emotionally arousing stimuli, and peaks are typically seen between 1-5 
seconds after the onset of an emotional stimulus. Skin conductance amplitude is expressed in 
units called mircroSiemens (μS), while latency and rise time are expressed in seconds. The 
amplitude measures the difference between the tonic SCL at the time the response was evoked 
and the peak of the SCR. Additionally, the latency period is the time between the stimulus and 
the onset of the event-related SCR (ranging from 1-3 seconds). Rise time focuses on the time 
between the onset of the event-related SCR and the peak of the response (ranging from 1-3 
seconds as well) and measures of recovery to baseline can be used to determine habituation.  
Habituation and Skin Conductance 
An important strength of measuring SCR is the ability to assess diminishing effects and 
its eventual disappearance, following repeated presentation of the stimulus or categories of 
stimuli (SCR habituation). Habitation has previously been assessed through skin conductance 
measures. The trials-to-habituation method involves counting the number of stimulus repetitions 
that are required to reach a predetermined level of physiological habituation. Typical guidelines 
suggest that habituation occurs after two or three trials, as no meaningful SCR magnitudes (≥ 
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.05) are evident at this point (Dawson et al., 2017). Habituation has also been assessed by 
utilizing analysis of variance to evaluate a “trials” main effect or interaction through the use of 
rates of decline of SCR magnitude across trials. Finally, the regression approach evaluates SCR 
magnitude on the log of the trial number and provides a slope and intercept score which are 
typically highly correlated (Dawson et al., 2017). 
 Researchers have utilized habitation of skin conductance response to investigate factors 
associated with emotional reactivity and its relationship with mental health disorders. For 
example, one study assessed skin conductance habituation to tones in patients with panic 
disorder (Roth et al., 1990). The results suggest that individuals with panic disorder experienced 
slower rates of habituation compared to healthy participants, as assessed via trials-to-habituation, 
total number of responses, and slope of decline of skin conductance (Roth et al., 1990). Walker 
and colleagues (2019) suggest an association between SCR habituation to a repeated acoustic 
startle stimulus and resilience-related psychometric constructs. Utilizing the slope measures of 
habituation, they found that steep negative slopes which reflect quicker rates of habituation 
corresponded with lower depression/anxiety and higher resilience, while slower or no habituation 
depict individuals who are less resilient (Walker et al., 2019). 
Purpose and Hypotheses  
 The primary aim of the current study is to rigorously investigate the influence of 
emotional reactivity on negative affect and executive functioning performance by integrating 
behavioural and physiological measures in an experimental research design. As noted, previous 
research investigating the theoretical frameworks of affect on executive functioning (e.g., the 
cognitive-load theory and mood-as-information theory) has been inconclusive. Negative mood 
may bias individuals towards a more analytic processing style and may also place demands on 
cognitive resources; however, the cognitive demand may vary for high- and low-reactive 
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individuals. As such, the current study suggests that the integration of these theoretical 
perspectives (i.e., mood-as-information theory and cognitive load theory) may be warranted and 
seeks to determine what underlying mechanisms may lead individuals high in emotional 
reactivity to benefit from negative mood states.  
Behaviourally, we are interested in investigating whether individual differences in self-
reported emotional reactivity will influence how negative affect (as induced by negative 
emotional stimuli) will impact performance on a working memory task. We hypothesize that 
affect will predict working memory performance, such that individuals high in self-reported 
emotional reactivity will perform better on working memory compared to their low-emotionally 
reactive counterparts within the negative condition. We do not expect significantly different 
performance within the neutral condition. 
 Physiologically, we seek to examine whether differences in self-reported emotional 
reactivity will be evident in underlying physiological responses during executive functioning 
performance. We hypothesize that individuals high in self-reported emotional reactivity will 
evidence high phasic peaks at the onset of negative emotional stimuli within the task but will 
have fewer trials-to-habituation to the emotional stimuli compared to low emotionally reactive 
individuals. We suspect this may occur as high emotionally reactive individuals are more 
practiced at utilizing their executive skills within negative affective states, as negative moods are 
generally more common for these individuals. As a result, habituation of the physiological 
response enables shifting of attention from the negative emotional stimuli to the task at hand.  
Two analytic designs are proposed. The first design involves multilevel models, which 
will assess whether emotional reactivity (high vs. low) and image condition (negative and 
neutral) influence performance on working memory (proportion correct per trial) and 
physiological responses (SCR). The second design includes general linear models (repeated 
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measures ANOVA), which will assess whether differences in trials-to-habituation scores would 
be observed based on image condition (negative and neutral), emotional reactivity (high vs. low) 
and their interaction. Table 1 outlines the research questions, hypotheses, analytic approach, and 





Ninety-one undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the study in exchange 
for partial course credit. Previous studies have demonstrated that the influence of emotional 
reactivity on executive functioning is different depending on whether one is high-reactive (+1 
SD from the mean) and low-reactive (-1 SD from the mean), with little effect on individuals who 
are average (Gable & McAuley, 2018; Gable & McAuley, in press). As such, only those 
determined via a prior mass-testing survey to have high (> 50; n = 51) or low (< 15; n = 36) total 
scores on the Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS) were eligible. The only other eligibility 
requirement was operating a computer mouse using their right hand, as skin conductance 
electrodes were applied to left hands. Additionally, after study completion, we excluded two 
participants with an accuracy score of < .85 on the Symmetry Span Task to ensure that 
participants were paying attention to the irrelevant processing components of the task (see 
Conway et al., 2005), as well as two other participants with technological glitches. For the 
physiological analyses, an additional participant was removed as over 90% of this individual’s 
data was invalid. In sum, we had 87 participants in our behavioural models, and 86 in our models 
involving physiological data. 
For multilevel models that nested trials within participants, a total of 24 trials were 
removed from analyses (1.65%) as a result of having invalid physiological data (i.e., ceiling 
artifacts in which the circuit is overloaded and floor artifacts in which electrodes lose contact 
with the skin). The sample of 87 participants included in the behavioural analyses of the study 
consisted of 71 females (81.6%), 15 males (17.2%), and 1 participant who identified as other 
(1.2%). Participants ranged between the ages of 18-40 years (M = 19.6, Mdn = 19, SD = 2.7). 
Forty percent of participants identified as Caucasian, 11.5% identified as Chinese, 4.6% 
identified as East Indian, and the rest reported having multiple or other ethnicities.  
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Procedure  
Post-consent, non-invasive skin conductance measures were applied to participants’ 
fingers (described further below). Following this set up, participants’ resting physiological 
measures were recorded while watching a relaxing fireplace movie for 20 minutes and they then 
completed the computerized task of working memory (e.g., Modified Shortened Symmetry Span 
Task) that had emotional images embedded throughout. Emotional images were meant to impact 
physiological arousal by eliciting peaks in SCR. Following the task, participants had a resting 
period of 5 minutes where they watched a shortened version of the fireplace video to return to 
baseline levels of physiological arousal. Participants were then asked to complete the Self-
Assessment Manikin, Emotion Reactivity Scale, and a demographic questionnaire. The skin 
conductance electrodes were removed, and participants were provided with feedback about the 
study. After completing the study, participants received 1.5 course credits. The current study’s 
protocol was reviewed and approved by the University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.  
Apparatus 
Video Recording 
Two computers were utilized in the study session. Participants used one to complete the 
study tasks, and the other recorded and displayed the skin conductance data to the researcher. 
Participants’ computer screen was recorded with a Logitech c270 webcam that was positioned on 
the table in front of the participant so that the screen (and not the participant’s face) was visible 
in the video. 
Skin Conductance 
SCR was recorded using non-gelled passive electrodes attached to participants’ index and 
ring finger on their left hand. The skin conductance electrodes were connected to an 
ADinstruments PowerLab (model 8/30) with a Galvanic Skin Response amplifier. A 1000 Hz 
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sampling rate was used and LabChart 7.0 analysis software was utilized in order to analyze SCRs 
based on the precise time of image presentation for each trial. Based on frequency distributions 
of response latencies to stimuli, common practice in research utilizing SCR is to have a 1-3 
second or 1-4 second latency period (Dawson et al., 2017). Given the short duration of stimulus 
presentation in the current study, 1 second was used as the latency period, and a 3 second 
window was used to calculate the SCR. This variable was computed by subtracting the value of 
skin conductance at the 1 second mark of image exposure from the maximum value of skin 
conductance (i.e., SCR peak) within the 3 second window. Physiological habituation was 
assessed using the trials-to-habituation method for each participant (Dawson et al., 2017). SCR 
magnitudes were reviewed in the order of stimulus repetitions for each category of stimulus (i.e., 
negative and neutral). As such, two trials-to-habituation scores were acquired per participant; 
habituation to the negative condition and habituation to the neutral condition. Habituation to each 
condition was defined as two consecutive SCR magnitudes £ .05 to stimulus presentations within 
that category. 
Resting Baseline Video  
Participants watched a fireplace video, which has previously been used in skin 
conductance research (Branje et al., 2014), for 20 minutes immediately following electrode 
application. Skin conductance measurements during this time were used as a baseline. The same 
video was presented immediately following the working memory task for 5 minutes to allow 




Modified Shortened Symmetry Span Task 
The Shortened Symmetry Span Task (Foster et al., 2015) is a measurement of working 
memory, which requires memory of squares’ spatial locations on a 4x4 grid with distraction 
tasks involving symmetry judgments of abstract designs on an 8x8 grid interleaved throughout. 
The modified task was shortened to one block, and included affective images from the IAPS 
(i.e., negative and neutral images) that were displayed for 5 seconds at the beginning of each 
trial. The images were presented in an intermixed and randomized order, and condition was not 
blocked to ensure that participants would not anticipate a continuous set of negative images. We 
attempted to reduce risk that participants would disengage from a block of negative images to 
avoid unpleasantness, thereby impacting physiological responses. A 5-second image presentation 
was chosen as SCRs can be activated in this timeframe (Dawson et al., 2017), while not 
disrupting the flow of the Symmetry Span Task. Each trial included a sequence that ranged from 
2-5 sets of memory-judgment (e.g., encoding phases) and symmetry-judgement items. At the end 
of each trial, the sequence of spatial locations was to be recalled in the same order of 
presentation (see Figure 2). Following practice, participants completed a total of 16 trials (i.e., 8 
negative trials and 8 neutral trials). Working memory was indexed by the symmetry span partial 
score, which reflects the total number of spatial locations correctly recalled across trials. The 
internal consistency of partial span scores across conditions was .77.  
Emotion Reactivity Scale (ERS) 
The ERS (Nock et al., 2008) is a 21-item self-report scale on experiences of emotions 
when reacting to affective events, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from not at all like me (0) 
to completely like me (4). This scale assesses 3 facets of emotional reactivity, including a 
subscale for emotional sensitivity (e.g., “my feelings get hurt easily;” 8 items), emotional 
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persistence (e.g., “when something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about for a long 
time;” 3 items), and emotional arousal/intensity (e.g., “when I experience emotions I feel them 
very strongly/intensely;” 10 items). Responses are summed to create a total score ranging from 
0-84. The ERS demonstrates strong internal consistency with an overall alpha of .94 (Nock et al., 
2008). In the present study, we observed an internal consistency with an overall alpha at .98. 
Participants completed this scale as part of mass testing, which determined eligibility and was 
used in analyses, as well as at the end of the in-lab study procedures, results of which are not 
discussed herein as variability in scores existed between the two time points.  
The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 
The SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) is a measure used as a non-verbal, subjective rating of 
one’s appraisals of images viewed in the study. Participants were presented with the same 16 
images they observed during the Symmetry Span Task and were asked to rate their emotions in 
relation to valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant), arousal (ranging from excited to calm), 
and dominance (ranging from experiencing feelings of low control to high control when looking 
at the picture; Figure 3; Bradley & Lang, 1994), all on 5-point scales.  
Demographic Questionnaire 





Table 1 describes the analytic approach and expected findings based on the study 
research questions and hypotheses. The vast majority of analyses were conducted using 
multilevel models. Multilevel models nested the 16 trials within participants. Within these 
models, predictors that were obtained for each of the 16 trials (e.g., proportion correct, SCR, 
image condition, SAM ratings, and set size) were entered as level-1 predictors, and pre-screen 
emotional reactivity was entered as a level-2 predictor. Cross-level interactions were also 
examined. For data not assessed using multilevel models (data at the participant level), general 
linear models were used. Across all models, image condition (-1 = negative, +1 = neutral) was an 
effect coded predictor. Although we pre-screened participants based on high (> 50) and low (< 
15) values of the ERS, standardized continuous scores from this measure were used in the 
analyses. In-lab ERS scores were not assessed, as a number of participants who were eligible 
based on pre-ERS scores fell into the 15-50 score range for the in-lab measure, likely as an 
artifact of it being administered following the study tasks. Although pre-screen ERS and in-lab 
ERS were highly correlated (see Bivariate Correlations section below), pre-screen ERS was used 
in the subsequent analyses. Performance on the working memory task was assessed by 
calculating proportion correct for each trial by dividing mean partial span scores for that trial by 
the trial set sizes. This computation determined the proportion of correctly recalled squares for 
that specific trial (e.g., 1 square correctly recalled in a set size of 2 resulted in a proportion 
correct score of .50 for that trial). SCR magnitudes were generated for each of the negative and 
neutral trials, as were subjective ratings of valence, arousal, and dominance from the SAM for 
each of the 16 images preceding the trials. Trials-to-habitation scores were not assessed at each 
trial; rather, they were calculated for each condition (negative and neutral) at the participant 
level. Thus, analyses assessing trials-to-habituation scores were examined using a repeated 
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measures ANOVA instead of multilevel models. Simple effects were probed by pooling error 
across the omnibus term. All analyses were completed on IBM SPSS 24 Statistics.  
Prior to analyses, descriptive statistics were completed, and assumptions of normality 
were assessed. Values of three standard deviations above or below the mean were flagged as 
outliers. The skewness and kurtosis of the outcome measure (proportion correct) fell within the 
normality assumptions per Kline (1998); |skewness| < 3 and |kurtosis| < 10. Univariate outliers 
were assessed using z scores in order to determine whether any scores exceeded three standard 
deviations above or below the mean, and no cases were identified. Descriptive statistics of all 
major variables in the study are presented in Table 2.  
Validation of Images 
The Appendix includes the list of IAPS images utilized in the study. Using IAPS 
guideline ratings (Lang et al., 2008), negative and neutral images were selected to vary in 
valence whilst having comparably high levels of arousal. The latter was done to ensure that 
arousal would not be a confound when comparing results for the negative and neutral conditions. 
Using the IAPS validation sample, the valence of negative images (M = 2.50, SD = 0.43) and 
neutral images (M = 5.07, SD = 0.65) were significantly different, t(14) = 9.30, p < .001, whereas 
arousal ratings for negative (M = 5.76, SD = 0.14) and neutral (M = 5.76, SD = 0.20) images 
were statistically similar, t(14) = -0.03, p = .977. In our sample, the valence of negative images 
and neutral images was also significantly different, t(86) = -21.90, p < .001, with negative 
images rated as more unpleasant than neutral images. However, participants rated negative 
images as being more arousing than neutral images, t(86) = -6.83, p < .001. Likewise, dominance 
was also significantly different for neutral and negative images, t(86) = -6.29, p < .001. 
Participants rated negative images as resulting in feelings of less control of the situation in the 
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image than neutral images. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics of SAM valence, arousal, and 
dominance ratings at the participant level. 
Bivariate Correlations of Study Variables at the Participant Level 
 Although there was variability between emotional reactivity scores on the ERS during 
mass testing and within the lab, bivariate correlations indicated that emotional reactivity pre-
study and within-study were significantly correlated with one another at the participant level, r = 
.89, p < .001. Further, bivariate correlations between major study variables by condition were 
examined at the participant level. Emotional reactivity was not significantly associated with 
partial span scores, SAM ratings of valence, arousal, and dominance, SCR, and trials-to 
habituation (all within both the negative and neutral conditions); however there was a was 
trending level significant association between emotional reactivity and trials to habituation in the 
negative condition, r = -.21, p = .050. All other bivariate correlations are presented in Table 3. 
Base Model of Image Condition on Proportion Correct 
When used as a lone predictor of proportion correct, image condition did not significantly 
predict proportion correct, b = 0.01, t(1261.73) = 1.42, p = .156 (see Table 4). Further, as set size 
accounted for a significant proportion of the variance associated with proportion correct, b =       
-0.13, t(1238.27) = 20.43, p < .001, when tested with image condition, it was included as a 
covariate in all future models. With this added covariate, image condition still did not 
significantly predict proportion correct, b = 0.01, t(1235.41) = 1.48, p = .140 (see Table 4). 
Emotional Reactivity, Image Condition, and Proportion Correct 
Further analyses were conducted to examine whether emotional reactivity moderated the 
effect of image condition on proportion correct, while covarying for set size (see Table 4). Set 
size remained a significant covariate, b = -0.13, t(1235.23) = 20.47, p < .001, and the main effect 
of image condition was again non-significant,  b = 0.01, t(1232.13) = 1.47, p = .141. Emotional 
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reactivity prior to study enrollment also did not produce a significant main effect, b = 0.00, 
t(375.77) = 0.51, p = .611. However, a significant interaction indicated that emotional reactivity 
moderated the effect of image condition on proportion correct, b = 0.02, t(1210.85) = 2.13, p = 
.033.  
Simple Effects of Emotional Reactivity Within Image Condition 
Within the negative image condition, there was a trending level effect of emotional 
reactivity, b = -0.02, t(789.24) = 1.71, p = .087, such that individuals higher in emotional 
reactivity performed worse on the working memory task than those low in emotional reactivity. 
Conversely, within the neutral image condition, emotional reactivity had no impact on proportion 
correct, b = 0.01, t(787.27) = 0.91, p = .362 (see Table 4). In sum, contrary to our hypotheses, 
individuals high in emotional reactivity had worse performance on proportion correct within the 
negative condition compared to their lower-emotionally reactive counterparts. See Figure 4 for 
further details.  
Moderation of Emotional Reactivity, Image Condition, and SAM Ratings on Proportion 
Correct  
 Moderation analyses were conducted to assess the influence of emotional reactivity, 
image condition, and the three SAM ratings scales (valence, arousal, and dominance) on 
proportion correct while covarying for set size. In all three models, set size was a significant 
covariate, however, no simple effects or interactions were statistically significant (see Table 5). 
SCR and Emotional Reactivity 
 We assessed the extent to which subjective ratings of emotional reactivity predicted 
measures of skin conductance. Interestingly, emotional reactivity did not significantly predict 
measures of SCR, b = -0.02, t(293.63) = 0.62, p = .539. Similar results were observed when 
 31 
examining the interaction between emotional reactivity and condition on SCR, while including 
set size as a covariate (see Table 6). 
SCR and Proportion Correct 
 We tested the extent to which SCR and image condition predicted proportion correct, 
while covarying for set size (see Table 4). Set size was a significant covariate, b = -0.13, 
t(1209.30) = 20.37, p < .001, and the main effect of image condition significantly predicted 
proportion correct, b = 0.02, t(1237.31) = 2.15, p = .031. Thus, participants scored higher on 
proportion correct within the neutral condition. Additionally, the main effect of SCR per trial 
significantly predicted proportion correct, b = -0.02, t(1358.78) = 2.77, p = .006, such that 
individuals with higher SCRs performed worse on proportion correct than those with lower 
SCRs (see Figure 5). Image condition and SCR per trial did not significantly interact, b = -0.01, 
t(1240.40) = 1.09, p = .277. 
Trials-to-Habituation by Image Condition and Emotional Reactivity 
Omnibus Analysis 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test differences in trials-to-habituation 
scores by image condition (negative and neutral), emotional reactivity, and the interaction of 
image condition and emotional reactivity. The main effect of image condition, F(1, 84) = 1.27, 
MSE = 4.14, p = .264, η2p = .02, and emotional reactivity, F(1, 84) = 1.67, MSE = 13.73, p = 
.200, η2p = .02, were not statistically significant. Furthermore, the interaction between image 
condition and emotional reactivity was not statistically significant, F(1, 84) = 2.97, MSE = 4.14, 
p = .089, η2p = .03, although this reached trending level significance. Given our hypothesis that 
individuals with higher emotional reactivity would habituate to the negative conditions faster 
than their low-emotionally reactive counterparts, further analyses were conducted to assess the 
impact of emotional reactivity on trials-to-habituation scores in both conditions.  
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Simple Effects of Emotional Reactivity on Trials-to-Habituation Scores 
A test of the simple effects indicated that there was a trending level significant effect of 
emotional reactivity on negative trials-to-habituation scores, F(1, 84) = 3.94, MSE = 8.71, p = 
.050, η2p = .05, such that individuals higher in emotional reactivity had lower trials-to-
habituation scores, and thus habituated to the negative image condition more quickly (see Figure 
6). There was no significant effect of emotional reactivity on neutral trials-to-habituation scores, 




To further elucidate underlying mechanisms that may explain why emotional reactivity 
moderates the relationship between negative affect and some aspects of executive functioning, 
this project utilized both subjective self-reports of emotional reactivity as well as more objective 
physiological indicators through skin conductance responses. Previous work in our lab has 
shown that high levels of negative mood are detrimental to the executive functioning task 
performance of low-reactive individuals, whereas the opposite pattern is observed in their high-
reactive counterparts (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; Gabel & McAuley, in press). The current study 
examined whether self-report and physiological markers of emotional reactivity influenced 
performance on a working memory task with embedded affective stimuli (i.e., neutral and 
negative images). Specific questions included (1) will individual differences in self-reported 
emotional reactivity influence how negative affective stimuli impact performance on a working 
memory task, and (2) will differences in self-reported emotional reactivity be evident in the 
underlying physiological response during working memory performance. To address these 
questions, participants completed self-report questionnaires measuring emotional reactivity as 
well as a task of working memory, while physiological measures of skin conductance were 
recorded.   
With regards to our first research question, we hypothesized that individuals high in self-
reported emotional reactivity would perform better in the negative condition of a working 
memory task compared to their low-emotionally reactive counterparts. This hypothesis was 
based on suggestions by prior work (Gabel & McAuley, 2018; Gabel & McAuley, in press) that 
emotional reactivity influences whether negative moods engender a more analytic thinking style 
that is beneficial to some kinds of cognitive task performance (i.e., in more reactive individuals) 
or engenders cognitive load that is detrimental to cognitive task performance (i.e., in less reactive 
individuals). We did not expect to observe significant differences between high- and low-
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reactive individuals within the neutral condition. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that 
individuals with high emotional reactivity performed worse on the working memory task in the 
negative condition compared to individuals with low emotional reactivity. In line with our 
prediction, however, high and low-emotionally reactive participants performed comparably in 
the neutral condition. Our diverging findings from those reported by Gabel and McAuley (2018, 
in press) may have been influenced by methodological differences associated with the type, 
length, and operationalization of mood inductions used. Gabel and McAuley (2018, in press) 
examined natural variations in participants’ mood states and also induced mood states with a 
well-validated induction procedure (written task with mood congruent music) prior to 
administration of executive functioning tasks. Contrastingly, participants in the present study 
were exposed to negative and neutral images for 5 seconds within the Shortened Symmetry Span 
Task, which allowed us to examine physiological responses and working memory performance 
simultaneously.  
The use of images may have negatively impacted performance on the working memory 
task for a number of reasons. Recent work has demonstrated that task-irrelevant images shown 
during a test of working memory disrupted performance to a greater extent when negative 
images were shown compared to neutral images (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Anticevic et al., 
2010). Wingert and colleagues (2018) further found that content that is emotional in nature 
impeded working memory encoding processes, particularly when the stimuli were negatively 
valanced and highly arousing. Pessoa (2009) proposed a dual competition model, suggesting that 
cognitive performance is impaired by emotional content as resources need to be distributed 
between both the task itself and the task-irrelevant emotional stimuli. The findings from the 
present study suggest that individuals high in emotional reactivity might be particularly 
susceptible to distraction associated with negative images, even though this does not seem to be 
 35 
reflected in their skin conductance response or SAM ratings. The intermittent images presented 
may have led high-reactive individuals to allocate greater resources to the negative images than 
those low in emotional reactivity, disrupting their cognitive processing in the negative condition, 
and ultimately worsening performance. 
Although IAPS images have been widely used as effective mood inductions in research, 
it is possible that their use in this study elicited emotional responses rather than shifts in mood 
states. Distinctions in moods and emotions have been previously noted in the literature. Mood 
has been characterized as a controllable, persistent, and primarily cognitive experience resulting 
from a non-defined cause (Beedie et al., 2005). Moods are also typically mild and do not have 
distinct physiological patterns. Conversely, emotions are largely uncontrollable, short-lived, and 
result in behavioural or expressive actions. Emotions are caused by a particular object or event, 
felt more intensely than moods, and are evidenced by specific physiological patterns. As the 
negative and neutral conditions were interleaved and image presentation was very brief, it is 
possible that participants in our study experienced distinct emotional responses as opposed to 
enduring shifts in mood. Further, Bradley and Lang (2007) suggest that unpleasant images that 
portray human threat, animal threat, and mutilated bodies result in heightened SCRs across males 
and females. The images used in the present study did include some of these themes (see the 
Appendix), however, images were chosen based on comparable arousal for the two conditions, 
so we were limited in the categories of images that we could incorporate. As such, some of these 
themes (e.g., animal mutilation) were not included due to the restricted selection of images, 
which may have further contributed to the experience of emotional responses instead of shifts in 
mood states. Thus, while research suggests that negative moods may enhance executive skills in 
high emotionally reactive individuals by allowing them to engage in analytic thinking styles 
(mood-as-information theory), brief emotional reactions may diminish use of such skills by 
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adding cognitive load (cognitive load theory). This distinction should be examined in future 
studies by investigating whether unpleasant images with these three distinct themes and blocked 
trials of consistent negative and neutral images would more effectively shift mood, yielding 
results in line with Gabel and McAuley’s (2018, in press) findings.  
Our second research question focused on differences in physiological responses. We 
hypothesized that self-reported emotional reactivity would predict skin conductance measures, 
such that individuals with higher emotional reactivity would experience higher peaks following 
exposure to emotional stimuli. Contrary to our predictions, self-reported emotional reactivity did 
not predict SCR magnitudes. Similarly, when assessing SCR by image condition and emotional 
reactivity, there was no significant effect. A number of confounding factors may have 
contributed to these findings. Both emotional reactivity and electrodermal activity are influenced 
by individual differences in personality traits in the context of emotional stimuli (Berenbaum & 
Williams, 1995; Steenhaut et al., 2018; Mardaga et al., 2006). For example, neuroticism has been 
shown to increase emotional reactivity to sad film clips amongst both younger and older adults 
(Steenhaut et al., 2018). Additionally, high novelty seeking was associated with larger SCRs 
when positive or negative stimuli were displayed subliminally and high harm avoidance was 
associated with larger SCRs for positive, neutral, and negative images (Cloninger et al., 1993). 
Electrodermal activity has also been shown to be influenced by factors such as trait anxiety. For 
instance, Wilken and colleagues (2000) found that individuals with low trait anxiety experienced 
greater arousal (SCL, spontaneous SCR, and SCR) to stress than individuals high in trait anxiety. 
They postulated that high-trait anxiety individuals entered the study with greater arousal than 
individuals with low trait anxiety, and the induced stress from the task resulted in a peak of the 
inverted U-arousal curve, and an ultimate reduction in arousal. Factors such as these were not 
controlled for in our study and may have confounded the results by influencing the relationship 
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between emotional reactivity and skin conductance measures. Thus, future studies investigating 
the impact of emotional reactivity on physiological responses should control for possible 
confounding variables like personality traits. 
 Furthermore, the present study found that higher magnitudes of SCR resulted in poorer 
performance on proportion correct within the working memory task in both conditions. This 
finding is supported in the literature. Choi and colleagues (2013), for example, investigated the 
impact of three different levels of emotional arousal on performance during the 3-back working 
memory task while measuring physiological responses. They found that performance was better 
in the neutral (lower) arousal state compared to the tense (higher) emotionally arousing 
conditions, which they attributed to the activation of the sympathetic nervous system (Choi et al., 
2013). This is because shifts in electrodermal activity in response to emotionally-arousing 
content demonstrate the activation of the fight, flight, or freeze response in the sympathetic 
nervous system. As humans instinctually focus attention towards emotional stimuli that signifies 
threat, greater physiological changes negatively influence information processing of succeeding 
input. Thus, in Choi and colleagues’ (2013) study, performance in the higher arousal condition 
diminished, as attention was diverted to the high arousing images, and participants’ cognitive 
processing of the subsequent task was impaired. Developmental studies investigating 
electrodermal activity have demonstrated similar results by exhibiting that parasympathetic 
nervous system activation resulted in reduced arousal and better cognitive performance (Frick & 
Richards, 2001; Richards & Gibson, 1997). Within the present study, we posit that the high-
arousing images used throughout may have captured participants’ attention, resulting in 
intermittent moments of emotional responses activated by the sympathetic nervous system (as 
evidenced by high SCR peaks). As activation of the sympathetic nervous system increased, 
cognitive processing of the subsequent memory-judgment components from the working 
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memory task diminished, resulting in worse performance.  
 We were also interested in understanding the underlying mechanism by which emotional 
reactivity may influence performance on executive functioning tasks when in negative mood 
states. We hypothesized that high-reactive individuals would physiologically habituate to 
negative images more quickly, allowing them to shift attention back to the task and perform 
better than low-reactive individuals. In line with our prediction, high emotionally reactive 
participants had fewer trials-to-habituation in the negative conditions, indicating that they 
habituated to the negative images more quickly than low-emotionally reactive participants. 
Individuals both high and low in emotional reactivity habituated equally in the neutral condition. 
Gabel and McAuley (2018) suggested that individuals with high emotional reactivity experience 
negative mood states more frequently and may thus be more practiced at functioning while in 
these affective states through rapid habituation. Results from this study indicate that it is possible 
to habituate to a category of negative stimuli, instead of just repeated presentations of the same 
stimuli. However, while there was a more rapid habituation to emotional stimuli, this process 
may not necessarily improve functioning of executive skills. As such, physiological habituation 
may not be sufficient to shift participants’ attention back to the task at hand. It should be noted 
that this finding may have been impacted by the use of novel images presented for each trial 
instead of repeated images. Thus, although physiological habituation was observed for the 
condition itself, novel images that were simultaneously presented during a cognitive task may 
have demanded more attentional resources for individuals high in emotional reactivity, thereby 
impeding subsequent performance on the task. An interesting next step to further unpack this 
finding would be to compare whether the last few trials where participants have presumably 
habituated is the time in which we see improvements in working memory performance for those 
high in emotional reactivity, compared to low-reactive individuals. Additionally, future studies 
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could investigate how habituation to repeated stimuli, instead of habituation to general negative 
and neutral conditions, may impact results.  
 Unsurprisingly, study participants’ ratings of valence indicated that they found negative 
images to be more unpleasant than neutral images. However, although negative and neutral 
images were chosen on the basis of being comparable on arousal, participants in the present 
study rated negative images as more arousing than neutral images. This difference in ratings may 
be linked to the explosion of electronic mass media in the past decade. As young adults are 
continuously flooded with distressing content at the touch of a button through electronic devices, 
neutral images that were considered as highly arousing over a decade ago may not have the same 
impact on arousal in young adults today. Huesmann (2007) suggests that a process termed 
desensitization may be at play. Desensitization occurs when negative emotions that are 
automatically elicited in response to emotionally arousing content reduces in intensity, as the 
individual habituates to the emotional response, and physiological reactivity diminishes 
(Huesmann, 2007). As such, neutral images that were highly arousing in the past may no longer 
be perceived as equivalently arousing as the negatively valanced images when they are compared 
to the typical images seen in the media.  
Another notable finding in the study was that set size within the working memory task 
accounted for a significant proportion of variance on proportion correct, as higher set sizes 
resulted in poorer performance on the working memory task. Other studies investigating working 
memory performance have likewise found a list-length effect on performance. For example, 
Kline and Fiss’ (1999) study indicated that the recall accuracy on the Turner and Engle operation 
span (1989) decreased as operation set size increased due to greater working memory load. 
Further, Wingert and colleagues (2018) found that list length disproportionately impacted 
individuals with low working memory capacity on the Symmetry Span Task compared to those 
 40 
with high working memory capacity and that the impact of emotion and list length affected 
performance during specific set sizes (e.g., set size of 3 and 5). Unsworth and Engle’s (2007) 
investigation of the reliability of complex and simple span tasks proposed that list-length impacts 
proportion correct as a result of competing items that share the same cues on these span tasks. 
Evidently, our findings support the well-established notion that greater set-sizes negatively affect 
working memory performance.  
Although there is vast literature indicating that emotional reactivity is implicated in 
psychological dysfunction, the present study sought to investigate the potential benefits of 
negative affective experiences for those high in emotional reactivity. While the results from our 
study did not find that negative emotional stimuli improved performance, as seen in Gabel and 
McAuley (2018, in press), the findings suggest that there may be a particular threshold of 
negative affect that needs to be elicited in order to shift distracting emotional responses 
(cognitive load theory) to stable negative moods that promote detail-oriented analytic thinking 
styles (mood-as-information theory) and subsequent cognitive performance. Although high 
reactive individuals physiologically habituated more quickly to different negative images, 
performance still diminished, suggesting that habitation may not be enough to account for shifts 
in individuals’ attention back to the task at hand. Further research is required to determine what 
it is about stable negative mood states that allow highly reactive individuals to utilize their 
executive skills more masterfully than when they experience negative emotional responses in the 
absence of a mood shift.  
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the conclusions of the present 
study. Firstly, study testing was halted prematurely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and as a 
result, we had fewer participants enrolled than expected. Although multilevel modeling was used 
to help mitigate this effect through the use of a within-subjects study design, the findings still 
 41 
may have been impacted by having a smaller sample size than originally intended. Secondly, 
emotional reactivity was assessed through the ERS scale prior to and during the study. Although 
pre-study ERS scores and in-lab ERS scores were highly correlated, ratings between the two 
time points showed variability within participants, likely as a function of the in-lab ERS scale 
being administered after the study tasks. Thus, the data is reflective of pre-study ratings of 
emotional reactivity, and not in-lab ratings. Moreover, the study relied on physiological 
measures to assess shifts in emotional responses and moods. Incorporating self-report 
questionnaires to assess moods prior to and after the presentation of images would have been 
useful in clarifying the effectiveness or limitations of the mood induction used. Finally, 
according to Dawson and colleagues (2017), although trials-to-habituation scores are useful, they 
may be subject to distortions by the occurrence of one response. For example, whether a 
meaningful isolated SCR occurs at trial 2 or not considerably impacts the score (resulting in 
either a score of 0 or 2), and thus needs to be interpreted with caution. As such, future studies 
should include repeated presentations of the same images so that they are able to get a more 
accurate assessment of physiological habituation by extracting slopes rather than trials-to-
habitation scores.  
In conclusion, the current study extends our understanding of the relationship between 
negative affect and executive functioning by investigating behavioural and physiological indices 
of emotional reactivity. The results indicate that although physiological responses impact 
performance on a working memory task, highly reactive individuals who habituate more quickly 
to emotional responses don’t perform better on working memory tasks. The findings suggest that 
the benefits of negative affect on executive skills performance may only be reached at a 
particular threshold of being in a negative mood state, not otherwise achieved by experiencing an 
emotional response. If this threshold is not reached, emotional responses merely disrupt 
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Modified Shortened Symmetry Span Task 
 
 
Note. The Modified Shortened Symmetry Span Task of working memory includes affective 
IAPS images at the beginning of each trial. Images are presented for 5 seconds and are followed 
by sets including a symmetry-judgment task (i.e., irrelevant processing task) and a memory-
judgment task (i.e., encoding phase), as well as a serial recall grid at the end of the trial. 
Presented in this figure is a trial with 2 sets of symmetry- and memory-judgment tasks. Sets can 




Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 
 
Note. The Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) 5-point scale was used to rate subjective valence, 





Mean Proportion Correct by Image Condition and Emotional Reactivity (ER) 
 
 
Note. Individuals with high emotional reactivity performed worse on the working memory task 
(mean proportion correct) in the negative condition compared to those with low emotional 
reactivity. In the neutral conditions, high and low emotionally reactive individuals performed 





































Negative and Neutral Trials-to-Habituation Scores by Emotional Reactivity 
 
 
Note. ERS = Emotional Reactivity Scale scores (based on pre-study ratings). Individuals higher 
in emotional reactivity had lower trials-to-habituation scores, indicating that they habituated to 
the negative condition more quickly than those with low emotional reactivity. Both high and low 






























Neutral Trials-To-Habituation Scores Negative Trials-To-Habituation Scores
Linear (Neutral Trials-To-Habituation Scores) Linear (Negative Trials-To-Habituation Scores)
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Table 1  
 
Analytic Approach and Expected Findings Based on Study Research Questions and Hypotheses 





reactivity (high vs. 
low) influence how 






1) Affect will 
predict 
performance on the 
working memory 
task.  
2) High emotional 
reactivity will 







but not neutral 
conditions.  
1) Multilevel models nested trials 
within participants to assess whether 
affect (induced by image condition) 
predicted performance on the working 
memory task, with level-1 DV of 
proportion correct regressed on level-1 
IV of image condition.  
2) Multilevel models nested trials 
within participants to test whether 
emotional reactivity moderated the 
effect of image condition on proportion 
correct, while covarying for set size. 
Level-1 DV of proportion correct was 
regressed on level-2 IV of emotional 
reactivity and level-1 IV of image 
condition with level-1 covariate of set 
size, along with their cross-level 
interaction term. Simple effects within 
image condition were further 
conducted. 
1) Image condition will be a 
significant predictor of 
proportion correct on the 
working memory task.  
2) There will be a significant 
difference in performance for 
individuals with high and 
low emotional reactivity, 
such that those with high 
reactivity will perform better 
on working memory task 
(proportion correct) 
compared to those with low 
reactivity in the negative 
condition. There will be no 
significant difference in the 
neutral condition.  
Physiologically: 
Will differences in 
emotional 
reactivity (high vs. 








on the working 
memory task? 





responses (SCR).   
2) Physiological 
responses and 
affect will predict 
performance on the 
working memory 
task.  









1) Multilevel models nested trials 
within participants to assess whether 
emotional reactivity and image 
condition predicted SCR. Level-1 DV 
of SCR regressed on level-2 IV of 
emotional reactivity and level-1 IV of 
image condition, with level-1 covariate 
of set size, along with their cross-level 
interaction term. 
2) Multilevel models nested trials 
within participants to test whether SCR 
and image condition predicted working 
memory. Level-1 DV of proportion 
correct was regressed on level-1 IV of 
SCR and level-1 IV of image condition 
with level-1 covariate of set size, and 
their interaction term. 
3) General linear models (repeated 
measures ANOVA) were used to assess 
whether differences were observed in 
trials-to-habituation scores, based on 
image condition, emotional reactivity 
and their interaction. 
1) Emotional reactivity will 
predict SCR, as individuals 
high in emotional reactivity 
will experience higher phasic 
peaks at the onset of negative 
emotional stimuli. 
2) SCR and image condition 
will predict proportion 
correct, such that high SCR 
magnitude will result in 
lower proportion correct on 
the working memory task.  
3) Individuals high in self-
reported reactivity will have 
fewer trials-to-habituation to 
the negative stimuli 
compared to low reactive 
individuals, leading to more 
rapid habituation and thus, 





Descriptive Statistics of Predictors and Outcome Measures at the Participant Level 
 
Variable N Mean SD 
Low ERS 36 8.83 4.14 
High ERS 51 59.20 7.36 
Partial Span Score 87 39.67 8.48 
Symmetry Accuracy 87 0.96 0.03 
Partial Span Score (Negative) 87 19.47 4.87 
Partial Span Score (Neutral) 87 20.20 4.53 
SAM Valence (Negative) 87 1.62 0.43 
SAM Valence (Neutral) 87 2.87 0.43 
SAM Arousal (Negative) 87 2.64 0.65 
SAM Arousal (Neutral) 87 3.13 0.68 
SAM Dominance (Negative) 87 2.32 0.81 
SAM Dominance (Neutral) 86 2.76 0.91 
SCR (Negative) 86 0.42 0.46 
SCR (Neutral) 86 0.48 0.48 
Habituation Scores (Negative) 86 3.37 3.00 
Habituation Scores (Neutral) 86 3.02 3.01 
Note. ERS = Emotional Reactivity Scale scores (based on pre-study ratings); SAM Valence, 
Arousal, and Dominance = the Self-Assessment Manikin subscales; SCR = skin conductance 
response; Habituation Scores = trials-to-habituation scores. Lower SAM Valence scores indicate 
higher ratings of unpleasantness, lower SAM Arousal scores indicate greater ratings of arousal, 





Bivariate Correlations Between Major Study Variables at the Participant Level 
Note. Behavioural data, N = 87; Physiological data, N = 86. ERS = Emotional Reactivity Scale 
scores (based on pre-study ratings); Span = partial span scores; Neg = negative condition; Neut = 
neutral condition; Valence, Arousal, and Dominance (Dom) = Self-Assessment Manikin 
subscales; SCR = skin conductance response; Habit = trials-to-habituation scores.  
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
  
Measure 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. ERS  -.12 .07 -.03 -.05 -.09 .02 .03 .04 -.03 -.04 -.03 -.21† 
2. Span (Neg) 
 
.63** .10 .10 .07 -.05 -.06 .05 .12 -.03 .13 .04 
3. Span (Neut) 
  
-.06 .12 .10 .09 -.06 .11 -.07 -.14 .14 .06 
4. Valence (Neg) 
   
.21* .42** .17 .41** .33** .12 .01 .05 -.02 
5. Valence (Neut) 
    
.07 .34** .06 .25* .11 -.06 .20† .08 
6. Arousal (Neg) 
     
.49** .39** .22* .15 .12 -.02 -.01 
7. Arousal (Neut) 
      
.18† .34** .02 -.07 .07 -.03 
8. Dom (Neg) 
       
.72** .05 -.04 .03 -.17 
9. Dom (Neut) 
        
-.01 -.10 .04 -.07 
10. SCR (Neut) 
         
.74** .46** .44** 
11. SCR (Neg) 
          
.18 .41** 
12. Habit (Neut) 
           
.53** 




Fixed Effects Estimates for Models of the Predictors of Proportion Correct 
 
Model Parameter Proportion Correct 
  
 n     -2*log likelihood Fixed Effects  
Base  Intercept 1368 771.55 0.76 (0.01) *** 
 Level 1 
     
      Image Condition   
 
0.01 (0.01)   
Base (with Cov) Intercept 1368 415.84 1.22 (0.02) *** 
 Level 1 
     
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 (0.01) *** 
       Image Condition     0.01 (0.01)   
ERS and  Intercept 1368 426.64 1.22 (0.02) *** 
Image Condition Level 1 
     
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 (0.01) *** 




           Neutral Image Condition 674 423.86 -0.02 (0.01) 
† 
           Negative Image Condition 678 423.86 0.01 (0.01) 
 
 Level 2 
     




 Cross-level Interactions 
     
       Image Condition*ERS     0.02 (0.01) * 
SCR Intercept 1352 401.50 1.23 (0.02) *** 
 Level 1 
     
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 (0.01) *** 
      Image Condition 
  
0.02 (0.01) * 
      SCR 
  
-0.02 (0.01) ** 
 Interactions 
     
       Image Condition*SCR     -0.01 (0.01)   
Note. Image Condition = negative and neutral conditions; Cov = covariate; ERS = Emotional 
Reactivity Scale score (based on pre-study ratings); SCR = skin conductance response.  





Fixed Effects Estimates for Moderation of Emotional Reactivity, Image Condition, and Self-
Assessment Manikin Subscale Ratings on Proportion Correct (Covarying for Set Size) 
Model Parameter     Proportion Correct 
  Fixed Effects n 
    -2*log 
likelihood      b SE df t p 
SAM Ratings  Intercept 1368 455.44 1.20 0.03 1365.48 36.81 <.001 
(Valence) Level 1 
       
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 0.01 1234.53 20.24 <.001 
      Valence 
  
0.01 0.01 1342.27 0.99 .324 
      Image Condition 
  
0.00 0.02 1312.7 0.04 .965 
 Level 2 
       
      ERS 
  
0.00 0.02 1345.44 0.12 .904 
 Cross-level Interaction 
       
      ERS*Image Condition 
  
0.03 0.02 1291.84 1.44 .151 
      Valence*Image Condition 
  
0.00 0.01 1336.80 0.20 .844 
      ERS*Valence 
  
0.00 0.01 1358.75 0.18 .860 
      ERS*Valence*Image Condition 
  
-0.01 0.01 1328.23 0.64 .524          
SAM Ratings  Intercept 1368 452.21 1.20 0.03 1378.04 37.64 <.001 
(Arousal) Level 1 
       
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 0.01 1232.02 20.49 <.001 
      Arousal 
  
0.01 0.01 1375.14 0.90 .369 
      Image Condition 
  
-0.02 0.02 1285.14 0.78 .434 
 Level 2 
       
      ERS 
  
0.02 0.02 1250.77 1.04 .300 
 Cross-level Interaction 
       
    ERS*Image Condition 
  
0.01 0.02 1261.76 0.52 .604 
    Arousal*Image Condition 
  
0.01 0.01 1299.73 1.33 .182 
    ERS*Arousal 
  
-0.01 0.01 1372.53 1.40 .161 
    ERS*Arousal*Image Condition 
  
0.00 0.01 1285.89 0.36 .722 
SAM Ratings  Intercept 1368 455.42 1.22 0.03 1382.56 41.39 <.001 
(Dominance) Level 1 
       
      Set Size (Cov) 
  
-0.13 0.01 1236.04 20.44 <.001 
      Dominance 
  
0.00 0.01 1321.74 0.02 .985 
      Image Condition 
  
-0.01 0.02 1261.03 0.63 .528 
 Level 2 
       
      ERS 
  
0.02 0.02 1067.64 1.10 .272 
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Model Parameter     Proportion Correct 
  Fixed Effects n 
    -2*log 
likelihood b SE df t p 
 Cross-level Interaction         
     ERS*Condition   0.01 0.02 1248.13 0.81 .419  
     Dominance* Image Condition   0.01 0.01 1277.37 1.41 .159 
      ERS*Dominance   -0.01 0.01 1335.00 1.58 .113 
      ERS*Dominance*Image Condition   0.00 0.01 1265.72 0.25 .800 
Note. SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin; Cov = covariate; Image Condition = negative and 











Fixed Effects Estimates for Models of the Predictors of Skin Conductance Response 
Note. ERS = Emotional Reactivity Scale score (based on pre-study ratings); Cov = covariate; 
Image Condition = negative and neutral conditions. 
  
          
Model Parameter   Skin Conductance Response  
  Fixed Effects n 
   -2*log 
likelihood b SE df t p  
Base Intercept 1352  3810.30 0.46 0.03 294.20 13.53 <.001  
 Level 2               ERS   -0.02 0.03 293.63 0.62 .539  
ERS and  Intercept 1352 3824.93 0.42 0.09 1355.66 4.96 <.001  
Image Level 1         
Condition      Set Size (Cov)   0.01 0.02 1136.52 0.47 .637  
      Image Condition   0.04 0.03 1136.79 1.40 .161  
 Level 2         
      ERS   -0.02 0.03 292.53 0.62 .538  
 Cross-level Interactions         




Negative and Neutral High Arousal IAPS Images Used in Study. 
 
 

























































Neutral High Arousing Images: 
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